ISO/IEC. Third edition. Information technology — Security techniques — Evaluation criteria for IT security —. Part 2: Security functional. ISO/IEC (E). PDF disclaimer. This PDF file may contain embedded typefaces. In accordance with Adobe’s licensing policy, this file. The Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation is an international standard (ISO/IEC ) for computer security certification.
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As well as the Common Criteria standard, there is also a sub-treaty 155408-2 Common Criteria MRA Mutual Recognition Arrangementwhereby each party thereto recognizes evaluations against the Common Criteria standard done by other parties. Common Criteria certification cannot guarantee security, but it can ensure that claims about the security attributes of the evaluated product were independently verified.
Common Criteria – Wikipedia
There is some concern that 15048-2 may have a negative impact on mutual recognition. Instead, national standards, like FIPS give the specifications for cryptographic modules, and various standards specify the cryptographic algorithms in use. Additionally, the CC recognizes a need to limit the scope of evaluation in order to provide cost-effective and useful security certifications, such that evaluated products are examined to a level of detail specified by the assurance level or PP.
Objections outlined in the article include:. Archived from the original on August 1, Evaluations activities are therefore only performed to a certain depth, use 155408-2 time, and resources and offer reasonable assurance for the intended environment.
More recently, PP authors are including cryptographic requirements for CC evaluations that would typically be covered by FIPS evaluations, broadening the bounds of the Isoo through scheme-specific interpretations. Archived from the original PDF on April 17, Vendors can then implement or make claims about the security attributes of their products, and testing laboratories can evaluate the products to determine if they actually meet the claims.
In this approach, communities of interest form around isp types which in turn develop protection profiles that define isl evaluation methodology for the technology type. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. Major changes to the Arrangement include:. This is possible because the process of obtaining a Common Criteria certification allows a vendor to restrict the analysis to certain security features and to make certain assumptions about the operating environment and the strength of threats faced by the product in that environment.
This page was last edited on 6 Decemberat iiso Alternatively, the vendor should re-evaluate the product to include the application of patches to fix the security vulnerabilities within the evaluated configuration.
In other words, Common Criteria provides assurance that the process of specification, implementation and evaluation of a computer security product has been conducted in a rigorous and standard and repeatable manner at a level that is commensurate with the target environment for use. The compliance with Ixo is typically demonstrated to a National approval authority:.
Standard ISO/IEC , CC v Release 4
Various Microsoft Windows versions, including Windows Server and Windows XPhave been certifiedbut security patches to address security vulnerabilities are still getting published by Microsoft for these Windows systems.
If any of these security vulnerabilities are exploitable in the product’s evaluated configuration, the product’s Common Criteria certification should be voluntarily withdrawn by the vendor.
There are no security requirements that address the need to trust external systems or the communications links to such systems.
Webarchive template wayback links Interlanguage link template link number. Computer security standards Evaluation of computers ISO standards.
The TOE is applicable to networked or distributed environments only if the entire network operates under the same constraints and resides within a single management domain.
The UK has also produced a number of alternative schemes when the timescales, costs and overheads of mutual recognition have been found to be impeding the operation of the market:.
In Sept ofthe Common Criteria published a Vision Statement implementing to a large extent Chris Salter’s thoughts from the previous year.
Common Criteria is very generic; it does not directly provide a list of product security requirements or features for specific classes of products: Views Read Edit View history. This shows both the limitation and strength of an evaluated configuration.
Canada is in the process of phasing out EAL-based evaluations. In a research paper, computer specialist David A. The United States currently only allows PP-based evaluations.
Although some have argued that both paradigms do not align well,  others have attempted to reconcile both paradigms. Failure by the vendor to take either of these steps would result in involuntary withdrawal of the product’s certification by the certification body of the country in which the product was evaluated. Whether you run Microsoft Windows in the precise evaluated configuration or not, you should apply Microsoft’s security patches for the vulnerabilities in Windows as they continue to appear.
Wheeler suggested that the Common Criteria process discriminates against free and open-source software FOSS -centric organizations and development models. The evaluation process also tries to establish the level of confidence that may be placed in the product’s security features through quality assurance processes:.
In Septembera majority of members of 15408- CCRA produced a vision statement whereby mutual recognition of CC evaluated products will be lowered to EAL 2 Including uso with flaw remediation. Other standards containing, e.
List of International Electrotechnical Commission standards. Some national evaluation schemes are phasing out EAL-based evaluations and only accept products for evaluation that claim strict conformance with an approved PP.
Further, this vision indicates a move away from assurance levels altogether and evaluations will be confined to conformance with Protection Profiles that have no stated assurance level.
This will be achieved through technical working groups developing worldwide PPs, and as yet a transition period has not been fully determined.
CC was produced by unifying these pre-existing standards, predominantly so that companies selling computer products for the government market mainly for Defence or Intelligence use would only need to have them evaluated against one set of standards.