Nov 29, I can’t help but leaving my reading of Frank Jackson’s Epiphenomenal Qualia with a sense of wonder and a grinning awe. This, independent of. Sep 3, Frank Jackson () formulates the intuition underlying his that knowledge about qualia is impossible if qualia are epiphenomenal and he. Oct 2, Jackson quotes are from “Epiphenomenal Qualia.” Jackson describes himself as “a qualia freak”. The word “qualia” is the plural of the word.

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The Ability hypothesis implies that there is some knowledge that can only be acquired by having experiences of a particular kind and that this knowledge is nothing but knowing-how. Will she learn anything or not?

Conee’s acquaintance hypothesis identifies a third category of knowledge, “knowledge by acquaintance of an experience,” that is rpiphenomenal reducible to factual knowledge nor to knowing-how. It has been doubted that ‘directness’ in Loar’s sense provides an account for what one might call acquaintance: In order to show precisely that imaginative abilities are not sufficient for knowing what it is like, Conee introduces the following example: A general argument against the materialist strategy to answer objection by appeal to a theory about the special status of phenomenal concepts is developed in Chalmers He looks a little riled now.

This particular item of knowledge about B is inaccessible to A because A never had experiences of Q herself.

Both may have believed, in a sense the non-phenomenal sense that does not require use of phenomenal concepts that the sky appears blue to normal perceivers while still in their black-and-white environment they may have been told so by their friends.

The conclusion of the weaker version of the argument is merely an spiphenomenal claim that is compatible with denying the existence of non-physical facts.


The part of me in favour of rpiphenomenal would very much like a simple answer to a simple question. That riled me slightly, and I regret to say the slight tone of irritation shows in the piece. Nagel on the other hand seems to be jcakson that we cannot generalize from what our experience is like to what bat experience is like because they are too different from us.

What else can you say, except that Mary learns about a new part of the world when she sees colour for the first time? Alter points out that the knowledge argument needs the premise that all physical facts eppihenomenal be learned discursively and argues that this assumption has not been established.

The Knowledge Argument in Philosophy of Mind. That translates roughly to, well, pick one — dualism or physicalism?

Frank Jackson, Epiphenomenal qualia – PhilPapers

Arguments of that kind are found in Lockwoodchap. Dennett ; Dennett ; Churchland ; Maloney Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge. Jackson himself went on to reject epiphenomenalism, and dualism uqalia. This reasoning motivates his disjunctive account of knowing what it is like: Until some time ago Jackson was one of the very few philosophers who embraced epiphenomenalism.

Lewis and Nemirow presuppose that Mary’s epistemic progress after release consists in the acquisition of knowing what it is like e. The utmost that he could predict on this subject would be that certain changes would take place in the mucous membrane, the olfactory nerves epipphenomenal so on. I was taught epiphneomenal Michael Bradley, and he had some good arguments for dualism. The Knowledge Argument for Qualia.

Knowledge argument – Wikipedia

Jackson might think that there could be such beings, but only because he already has an argument that qualia are not part of the physicalist account. Some authors have raised doubts about the thought experiment itself. We could not do this unless behavior results from qualia The Ability Hypothesis says that knowing what an experience is like just is the possession of these abilities to remember, imagine, and recognize.


Open access to the SEP is made possible by a world-wide funding initiative. Trout,Contemporary MaterialismLondon: Mistakes About the Meaning of Life.


She argues that the property dualist wualia explain why the most direct way to get familiar with a quale is by having an experience of the relevant kind while the physicalist does not have any explanation for this particular feature of qualia. But he could not possibly know that these changes would be accompanied by the appearance of a smell in general or of the peculiar smell of ammonia in particular, unless someone told him so or he had smelled it for himself.

Jackson insists that when we release her from this black-and-white environment and expose her to colors for the first time, there is something new that she will learn. Martha has been told that cherry red is exactly midway between burgundy red and fire red she has experienced these two shades of red, but not cherry.

It is one of the most discussed arguments against physicalism. There could be some underlying third cause of both a. Fred consistently sorts the tomatoes the same way.

Jackson argues that knowledge about qualia is impossible if qualia are epiphenomenal and he concludes that something must be wrong with the jaxkson argument.